The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2015

Some Comments In Favour of the Abolition of
Fault Law
William F. Foster

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Foster, William F. (1975) "Some Comments In Favour of the Abolition of Fault Law," Akron Law Review: Vol. 8 :
Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Foster: Abolition of Fault Law

SOME COMMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE
ABOLITION OF FAULT LAW*
WILLIAM F. FOSTER*

*

T

HE ALARMING NUMBER of automobile accidents resulting in death or
injury to thousands of persons each year and the direct and indirect
costs associated with these accidents is one of the more depressing
features of modern life. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that
there will be a dramatic improvement in this situation in the foreseeable
future because: automobile transportation is central to the North American
way of life, the majority of drivers have no competence in anything but
routine driving situations, and often factors beyond a motorist's control
cause or contribute to accidents. For these reasons it is reasonable to
expect that automobile accidents will still occur even if all users of the
road exercise care and that the carnage on the highways must be regarded
as a phenomenon of twentieth century society.

The suffering and loss of life resulting from automobile accidents and
the consequent social and economic dislocations have forced governments
at all levels to give serious thought to the problems of alleviating the
plight of accident victims and their dependents. Thus, there has been
a re-evaluation of the fault system of compensation-its functions, its
bases, and its traditional principles. In the light of existing social,
economic and technical conditions, a search is being conducted for
meaningful reforms to, or alternatives for, that system.'
While there has 'been widespread agreement on the fact that reform
of the fault system of compensation is urgently needed there has been no
general agreement on the direction reform should take.2 However,. it is
possible to discern three broad categories of reform in the post-war period:

1. those directed at improving the operation of the fault system
of compensation both at the financial responsibility and
administrative levels;
* This article was presented as the keynote address at the Law Day U.S.A. program
of the University of Akron School of Law on May 1, 1974.
** LL.B., Auckland, New Zealand; LL.M., University of British Columbia. Barrister

and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. Currently Assistant Dean,
McGill University Law School.
1 For a discussion of the reason for abolishing the fault system and of the constitutionality of the "no-fault" legislation see Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 42
A.L.R.3d 194 (1971). But see Massachusetts No-Fault Opinion: Shallow Reasoning,
UnsupportedDicta, TRIAL, Vol. 7, No. 4 at 60 (July 1971).
2 See Ghiardi and Kircher, Automobile Insurance Reparations Plans: An Analysis ol
Eight Existing Laws, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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2. those which would supplement the fault system of compensation
with a scheme of no-fault insurance;
3. those which have as their objective the abolition of the fault
system of compensation and the introduction of a scheme of
accident insurance.
It is not surprising that there has been no unanimity on how best to
mitigate the disastrous financial consequences which the automobile
accident victim and his dependents so often have to bear. All investigations
into this problem are attended by controversy. The opponents and
proponents of the fault system of compensation and the various avenues
of reform are vocal, often vociferous. Interest groups are eager to present
their points of view-and to have them accepted.
THE FAULT SYSTEM AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
One such interest group is the legal profession. North American
lawyers have been, and are, vitally interested in all proposals to reform
the fault system of compensating the victims of automobile accidents
because they feel their vested interests threatened.3 Many lawyers specialize
in handling plaintiff claims for death and personal injury arising out of
automobile accidents; others specialize in the representation of the
interests of insurance companies.
Notwithstanding the vested interest that these advocates have in the
fault system and its continuance, their experience and "know-how" would
be exceedingly valuable in the search for solutions to the problems raised
by the system, and for a better system of dealing with the compensation
of victims of automobile accidents. These lawyers are skilled practitioners,
dedicated and effective. They know the problems involved within the
confines of the fault system in obtaining the truth and achieving justice
in the determination of the consequences of an automobile accident
which has resulted in loss of life or-limb.
Thus, it is a cause of concern when -a sizable segment of the legal
profession comes down on the side of the fault system of compensation
and protests any changes which would substantially restrict, or abolish
totally, recourse to that system by victims of automobile accidents. 4 Such
protest is widespread within the legal profession despite -thefact that the
5
fault system has been subjected to severe authoritative criticism.
3 See, e.g., AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTM
(1969); accord, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FAULT-A DETERRENT TO
HIGH AY ACCIDENTS (D. Ross ed. 1969). See also DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
PsYcHoLooIcAL

ASPECTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM AS COMPARED wrrIH THE NO-FAULT

SYSTEM OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (L. Lawton ed. 1969).
4
See, e.g., BARREAu DU QUEBEC, MEMOIRE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC AU COMrTE
D'ETUDE SUR L'ASSURANCE. AUTOMOBILE (1971); THE ADVOCATES' No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-THE NEW PROPOSALS (1974).
5See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CoNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIc'rm
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Why is it that so many lawyers are so keenly interested in retaining
the fault system with the courts as the final arbiters in fixing blame and
awarding damages? Is it blind faith in the concept of fault? The fault
concept is commonly, but erroneously, regarded as an integral and
long-standing part of our Anglo-American legal heritage. Is it because the
status quo best serves the interests of the legal profession? After all, a
substantial portion of the fees earned by North American lawyers comes
from automobile accident claims and litigation. Or, is it because the fault
system of compensation best serves the interests of society? The legal
profession would have the public 'believe that it is for the latter reason
that they so vehemently oppose all major reforms of the fault system of
compensation. Let us accept this position, for what it is worth, and
examine the arguments put by the profession in support of it.
At this juncture, I feel, it is necessary to clarify one thing. From the
stand taken by the legal profession on the question of how best to
compensate the victims of automobile accidents, it appears that the
profession believes that the legal system should concentrate, not on what
the public demands nor on what the public gets, nor even on what the
public needs or deserves, but rather that the legal system should
concentrate on what the public should get-and that it is to be the legal
profession which is to determine what -the public should get.
The problem with this state of affairs is that in deciding what the
public should get the person or body making that determination is in fact
making a value judgment-a decision which at bottom is both subjective
and unverifiable. The decision can be argued about, but in final analysis it
can only be regarded as valid if it accomplishes the ultimate objectives
sought to be achieved by 'the decision maker. And, whereas the value
judgment itself may not be verifiable as objective truth, it can be
ascertained through observation and analysis whether the goals sought
are in fact attained.
So let us now examine the declared objective .of the fault system,
compensating victims of automobile accidents. We shall also note the
various categories of reform which have 'been proposed or implemented
to determine whether this objective has been fulfilled.
THE DEFICITS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM

The fault system of compensation rests on the value judgment that
only a person who, by his fault, has caused loss to another ought to make
(1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON]; ISSON, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY (1967) [hereinafter cited as ISSON]; REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES IN NEW ZEALAND (1967); REPORT TO GOVERNOR
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT (1970);
GOUVERNEMENT

DU

QUEBEC,

RAPPORT

DU

COMITE D'ETUDE

SUR

L'ASSURANCE

AUTOMOBILE (1974).
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compensation to that other person. This principle in its modern day
6
application, its advocates contend, fulfils three functions:
1. It satisfies the public's sense of justice when the wrongdoer is
brought to account.
2. It deters people from acting irresponsibly.

3. It guarantees the injured party compensation commensurate to
the injury he sustains.

Justice
To the layman there is an identification in large measure of legal
responsibility with moral blameworthiness in the notion of fault-no one
who is not to blame, or who is not culpable, should be made to pay
compensation.
That legal fault corresponds to moral fault in the fault system of
compensation is a misconception. Legal fault is determined by reference
to the standard of the reasonable man-a creature of myth. The question
that is asked in any given case is not "was the defendant morally culpable
in causing the loss," but rather "did the defendant's conduct conform to
the standard of conduct which, in similar circumstances, could be expected
of the reasonable man." Thus, it is incorrect to think that the fault system
is concerned with genuine individual fault. It is concerned with the largely
7
fortuitous consequences of the defendant's conduct.
This situation is particularly true when the fault system is applied to
the field of automobile accidents, for here the causative factor in many
cases is not fault but mere human error-the unavoidable result not of
blameworthy conduct but of human imperfection. Unfortunately, human
error is often equated with fault because the question of compensating
some injured person hinges upon a finding of fault.
The hollowness of the notion of fault is perhaps best exemplified by
reference to the following facts:
s
1. That the use of common law and statutory presumptions of
9
imposed on a defendant, where
being
liability
in
fault can result
these presumptions operate to shift the burden of proof onto him,
not because in truth he was at fault, but because he was unable,
often for factors beyond his control, to establish his innocence.
2. That studies have shown there is a tendency for liability to follow
the incidence of insurance notwithstanding that fault should
6 See, e.g., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, No-FAULT
AUTO INSURANCE PROPOSALS (1971); KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS-THE SEARCH
FOR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO NEGLIGENCE LAW (1969).
7
See IssoN, supra note 5, at 10-12 and 18-22.
8 E.g., the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
9 E.g., Highway Victims Indemnity Act of 1964, R.S.Q., c.232, s.3 (Can.).
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be the sole criterion of liability ' 0 -and most automobile owners
possess liability insurance.
3. That the sanction of the fault system of compensation ignores
the moral quality of the defendant's conduct-it is a capricious
sanction over which the courts have little control once the
determination is made that the defendant is at fault."
All in all, the fault system of compensation is a kind of gamble. The
outcome of a case can depend not so much on the presence or
absence of true fault but on such factors as the skill of the lawyers,
the existence of insurance, the sentiment of the judge or jury, or the
availability of a witness.

Deterrence
The advocates of the fault system of compensation argue that it
serves as a deterrent to careless conduct, that the fear of civil liability
educates people to act responsibly. This is, at best, a dubious claim.
For a sanction -to 'be effective in curbing anti-social behaviour there
must be available to those persons whose conduct may result in an
imposition of the sanction, two possible courses of conduct. Assuming
arguendo that automobile accidents are statistically unavoidable, notwithstanding the use of care by motorists, and that human error and factors
beyond the control of drivers are the principal causes of accidents, does
the choice between two possible courses of conduct really exist? The
short answer appears to be no, unless it can be said that the choice lies
between driving and not driving.
However, the most glaring weakness in the argument -that the fault
system deters careless conduct is that 'the majority of motorists are
protected against the operation of the sanction of that system by liability
insurance. The possession of third party liability insurance by owners and
operators of automobiles is the rule, not the exception; and, in fact, most
jurisdictions encourage the purchase of such insurance.12 It cannot
realistically be claimed that a sanction can effectively control the activities
of persons immune to it.
Perhaps if liability insurance was abolished the threat of civil liability
would become an effective deterrent. But even this is doubtful since the
fear of death, bodily injury, imprisonment, loss of license and fines seem
to have little effect on driving habits.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that 'the sanction of the fault
system only operates when a person's fault causes damage to another to
whom he owes a duty. Careless driving which does not result in loss or

1OE.g.,

SAWYER, LAW IN SOCIETY 145 (1965).
11 The severity of the sanction is geared to the amount of damage caused.
12 Supra note 5.
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injury to a third party is outside the scope of the operation of the fault
system.13 Consequently, careless drivers who are prepared to run the risks
of death and bodily injury because of the belief that an accident will never
come their way will also be prepared (assuming that they even turn their
minds to the matter) to run the risk of civil liability.
Compensation
The remedy afforded an injured party by the fault system, namely
damages, is supposed to put the plaintiff in -the same position as he would
14
have been if he had not been injured. This, in theory, is the aim of the
fault system. In practice, however, no one will ever know how often
this aim is in fact achieved, although the evidence available would indicate
that such occurrences are rare.' 5
The assessment of all damages, with the exception of special damages,
is based on guesswork.' It is true that the courts have developed rules to
guide them in assessing damages but in final analysis an award is only an
approximation of the plaintiff's losses. It cannot be otherwise for two
reasons: first, precision in assessing future losses is impossible for no one
know what the future holds, or would have held, for the plaintiff; and
secondly, it is an impossible task to assess exactly, in monetary terms,
the compensatory value of physical disabilities ,and mental anguish. The
inevitable result is that some plaintiffs recover more, and others recover
less than full compensation.
This conclusion appears to be further supported by the rule that
7
the assessment of damages must be final.1 This rule precludes the
courts from re-examining an award despite the fact that the plaintiff's
lawyer may have made an error in computing his client's claim, or
that the extent and consequences of the injury may have been wrongly
predicted. The rule, in fact, appears to be in direct conflict with the
declared objective of damage awards.' 8
13 This point was made crisply in Haynes v. Harwood, I K.B.146, 152 (1935), where

the court held: "Negligence in the air, will not do; negligence in order to give a
cause of action must be the neglect of some duty owed to the person who makes
the claim."
14See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 135 (1973)

[hereinafter cited

as DoBas].
15 See KEETON and O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 34; ISSON, supra note 5, at 12-18;
REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 5, at 26-27; THE REPORT
OF THE OSGOODE

HALL

STUDY ON

COMPENSATION

FOR VICTIMS

OF AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENTS ch. 10 (Linden ed., 1968).
16 DOBBS, at 140.

17 In Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court held that it was error for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to grant the
railroad a new trial unless the petitioner would agree to remit $105,000 of a $305,000
award. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is an excellent example of the type of analysis
the trier of fact must follow to tabulate, in the aggregate, the future lost wages and
future pain and suffering for the purposes of a present personal injury award.
18 DOBBS, supra note 14.
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Many aspects of the actual operation of the fault system of
compensation (as distinguished from its objectives) -the inordinate delays
which appear to form an integral part of the system, the exorbitant waste
and expense that it involves, the evidentiary problems, and the practice of
awarding damages in a lump sum-have also been the subject of severe
criticism, and rightly so.19 However, I do not propose to deal in any detail
with these issues. The undeniable fact that the fault system does not meet
the objectives set for it by its supporters should be sufficient to force a
complete rethinking of the whole problem of how best to compensate the
victims of automobile accidents. That this has not been the case in many
instances is painfully obvious by an examination of the various categories
of reform which have been implemented in this area over the years.
ATTEMPTED REFORMS
The first group of reforms which were implemented were those
aimed at improving the operation of the fault system at the financial
20
responsibility and administrative levels.
To improve the financial responsibility of defendants, compulsory
insurance, financial responsibility and impoundment laws were introduced
to force, or at least encourage, all motorists to carry liability insurance.
Additionally, minimum insurance limits were set and assigned risk plans
were created to ensure that liability insurance was available to all. In the
event that a person was so unfortunate as to be injured by an uninsured
and impecunious motorist or by an unidentifiable automobile, recourse to
unsatisfied judgment funds or assigned claims plans was provided.
To further improve the plaintiff's chances of recovery a number of
jurisdictions, in some circumstances, removed from his shoulders the
burden of having to prove fault on the part of the defendant. Instead
they made it the defendant's duty to prove that he was not at fault in
causing the accident.
Finally, to improve the administration of the system interim payments
to plaintiffs, in those cases where the issue of liability was clear, were
introduced; and, in recent years, recourse has been had to arbitration
for small claims.
All of these reforms -assumed that the answer to the problem
presented by automobile accident victims lay within the fault system of
compensation-that all that was required to placate the critics of the
system was to try and rectify some of its operational defects. The reforms
did nothing to correct the fundamental flaw of the fault system-its failure
to achieve its basic objectives. In fact, a number of reforms (particularly
19 For a summary of the major indictments of the fault system and the responses to
these indictments see KEaTON, supra note 5, at 1-3.
2OFor a discussion of these reforms see KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 5.
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those encouraging the purchase of liability insurance and those effecting
the burden of proof) eroded the ability of the system to attain its
objectives by reintroducing problematical fault concepts.
Indeed, as the practice of insuring against liability became commonplace, impetus was given to the development of a fourth objective for the
system, namely that of loss distribution. 21 Underlying the fault system's
objectives of justice and deterrence is the idea that the loss caused by a
wrongdoer should be borne by him and the system was designed to ensure
that this occurred. However, through insuring against liability the wrongdoer instead of personally "footing the bill" assessed him under the fault
system, is able to pass the loss on until it is finally absorbed by an appreciable section of the community-wrongdoers and innocents alike. In other
words, "loss shifting" has been largely replaced by "loss spreading."
If the objective now sought is the distribution of losses arising from
automobile accidents there surely must be a simpler, more rapid, more
economic, and more just and equitable method of achieving this than
through the use of the fault system with its many defects.
No-FAULT PLANS
The continued attacks on the fault system of compensation, despite
the various reforms to that system just mentioned, led to the introduction
in some jurisdictions of no-fault insurance laws. These laws are based on:
1. The value judgment that all (or nearly all2) automobile accident
victims are deserving of compensation regardless of any question
of fault.
2. An acknowledgment that the fault system of compensation, with
all its inherent defects, is incapable of dealing satisfactorily
with the problem presented by automobile accident victims.
In view of this one would have thought that no-fault insurance plans, as
their name suggests, would have abolished, or at least severely restricted
recourse to the fault system of compensation. However, this has not been
the case. That is not to say that no-fault insurance laws lack any redeeming features-they do have the merit of providing some compensation
to persons who, under the fault system, would recover nothing at all.
It is unrealistic to believe that no-fault insurance laws will drastically
curtail recourse to the fault system of compensation since most schemes
have imposed a low limit on the amount of no-fault benefits a victim may
recover.23 This situation coupled with the fact that many plans place

21 See J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 13-30 (3d ed. 1967).

22 All schemes deny benefits to one or more categories of victims. See GENERAL
ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT
STATUTES (1973).
23
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-627.741 (1972); *ILL. ANN, STAT, ch. 73, §§ 1065
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24
no restriction on the right to sue for non-economic losses ensure that

there will be litigation.
In general it can be said that no-fault laws aggravate one of the
inequities of the fault system of compensation-the fact that small claims
are better serviced than large claims. Those persons who suffer severe

losses and who are in the greatest need of assistance still remain at the
mercy of the fault system.
Finally, it must be asked whether there is room for two conflicting
value judgments to operate in this area. The first, of course, being that
only those injured through the fault of another should receive compensation; and, the second being that all persons are entitled to compensation
regardless of any question of fault. No-fault insurance laws have created
a situation in which all persons are entitled to some compensation but in
which some persons are entitled to more compensation than others. And
the preferential treatment accorded some victims, if it can be so termed, is
not based on their innocence, but the innocence or fault of the person
causing the loss. Thus, -as between two innocent victims who suffer severe
loss one may recover only the no-fault benefits, while the other may
recover a substantially greater amount because he was fortunate enough
to be injured by another who is found to be at fault. Such an outcome
can hardly be termed equitable and just.
As one study has stated, no-fault insurance laws are merely palliatives
5
designed to patch up some of the defects of the fault system.2 No-fault
insurance laws do not come to grips with the fundamental unsoundness
of the fault system.
The value judgment that all automobile accident victims are entitled
to compensation irrespective of any question of fault places, I would
suggest, the problem presented by -the victims of automobile accidents in
its proper perspective. The judgment accepts automobile accidents for
what they are-an unavoidable and tragic factor of modern life, a
necessary evil, which 'affects all aspects of society from the 'home to the
national economy, the costs of which must be borne by society which is
150 - 1065.163 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) (found unconstitutional in Grace v.
Howlett, 51 Ml. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-546
(Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 743.786 - 743.835 (1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9 et seq. (Supp.
1974); The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, C.224, §§ 199-240 (Can.).
24
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.30 - §
627.710 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150 - § 1065.163 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 542 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.786 § 743.835 (1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9 et seq. (Supp. 1974); The
Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. 126, § 237 et seq. (Can.); The Insurance Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 224, § 199-240 (Can.); Automobile Accident Insurance Act, R.S.S. 1965,
c. 409 (as amended 1973) (Can.).
25
REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 5, at 49-55.
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after all the ultimate beneficiary of all the advantages of highway
transportation. The logic of this situation of necessity must lead to the
conclusion that the fault system of compensation, as we know it, must be
abolished. If it is felt that some distinction must be drawn between
victims let the only distinction be between the innocent victim and the
victim who is truly morally at fault.
The major objectives of any reform based on the above value
judgment should be threefold:
1. Community responsibility or, in other words, loss distribution.
2. Compensation of all victims of automobile accidents.
3. Real compensation for economic losses.
Deterrence is not an objective though it may well remain a factor in that
the contribution of members of society to the scheme should reflect
their driving record.
The only practical restriction on the type of reform here advocated is
a factor which affects so many judgments-namely, that of cost. However,
in view of the fact that a number of serious and comprehensive studies
(e.g., those undertaken in New York,N British Columbia 27 and Quebec 2 l)
have advocated the total abolition of fault liability, and the fact that one
jurisdiction, New Zealand, 29 has taken this step, I am very skeptical of the
argument that a combination of real compensation and the abolition of fault
liability would involve an impossible financial burden for -the community.
Of course, initially, there will have to be limits on the amounts and
heads of compensation payable. The first concern of reform should be to
provide real compensation for the economic losses of all victims. The
compensation of non-pecuniary losses should be of secondary importance.
That is not to say they should not ever be compensated. Rather, if the
resources available are found to be sufficient then these losses can also
be compensated within reasonable limits.

20 Id.
27 ROYAL COMMISSION ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, REPORT Or T E COMMISSIONERS

(2 vols. 1969).
28GouvERNEmENT DU QUEBEC, RAPPORT DU COMMITE D'ETUDE SUR L'ASsURANCE
AuToMOBILE (1974).
29

The Accident Compensation Act of 1972, Stat, No. 43 (as amcnded) (NZ).
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CONCLUSION
It is not necessary for those who advocate drastic reform to prove that
it is either ideal or perfect. Any system will necessarily be open ,to criticism
because of defects. However, it should be sufficient justification for change
in this imperfect world of ours if the new system meets the objectives set
for it and is relatively better or more just than the system it replaces.
I suppose it is trite to say that the task of law reform is not a simple
one, and that lawyers and the legal profession have a very special
responsibility to the public in this field.
It is true that with the introduction of no-fault insurance laws the
public has been presented with reform. But is it just a reform or is it
the best possible reform? I would suggest that it is the former-a
compromise solution that hopefully Will satisfy the public and yet not
upset the legal profession's "apple cart" to any great extent.
It is time for the legal profession to divorce itself from its peculiar
interest in the problem of the compensation of automobile accident
victims and to take an objective view of it. This is essential when we bear
in mind that the legal profession is so well represented in many legislatures,
and that the bar constitutes one of the most persuasive of lobby groups.
The image of the legal profession has become somewhat tarnished in
recent years and lawyers must realize that there is a critical relationship
between reform of -the existing fault system and their public image. While
the public's understanding of the defects in the law relating to the compensation of automobile accident victims is vague, it is clear they want reform
and we should ensure that they are presented with the best reform.
Fault law was developed to meet the needs of our society in the
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries; it is now time for us to
develop a system which can successfully grapple with -the problems
society currently faces. It is time for change-drastic change. The legal
profession is not immune to "future shock."
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